Agricultural extension and imperfect supervision in contract farming: Evidence from Madagascar

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Abstract

This article tests whether agricultural extension and imperfect supervision-conflated here into the number of visits by a technical assistant-increase productivity in a sample of contract farming arrangements between a processing firm and small agricultural producers in Madagascar. Production functions are estimated which treat the number of visits by a technical assistant as an input and which exploit the variation in the number of visits between the contracted crops grown on a given plot by a specific grower, thereby accounting for district-, grower-, and plot-level unobserved heterogeneity. Results indicate that the elasticity of yield with respect to the number of visits lies between 1.3 and 1.7.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)507-517
Number of pages11
JournalAgricultural Economics
Volume41
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1 2010

Keywords

  • Contract farming
  • Extension
  • Grower-processor contracts
  • Supervision

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