Aggressive Boards and CEO Turnover

Cyrus Aghamolla, Tadashi Hashimoto

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This study investigates a communication game between a CEO and a board of directors where the CEO's career concerns can potentially impede value-increasing informative communication. By adopting a policy of aggressive boards (excessive replacement), shareholders can facilitate communication between the CEO and the board. The results are in contrast to the multitude of models which generally find that management-friendly boards improve communication, and help to explain empirical results concerning CEO turnover. The results also provide the following novel predictions concerning variation in CEO turnover: (1) there is greater CEO turnover in firms or industries where CEO performance is relatively more difficult to assess; (2) the board is more aggressive in their replacement of the CEO in industries or firms where the board's advisory role is more salient; and (3) there is comparatively less CEO turnover in firms or industries where the variance of CEO talent is high.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)437-486
Number of pages50
JournalJournal of Accounting Research
Volume59
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2021

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© University of Chicago on behalf of the Chookaszian Accounting Research Center, 2021

Keywords

  • CEO replacement
  • CEO turnover
  • advising
  • board independence
  • communication
  • corporate governance

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