A test of stability in a linear altruism model

Christos A. Ioannou; Shi Qi; Aldo Rustichini

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.07.007

A test of stability in a linear altruism model

Christos A. Ioannou, Shi Qi, Aldo Rustichini

Economics (Twin Cities)

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2 Scopus citations

Abstract

Linear altruism predicts the estimated preferences to be independent of the subject's position in the game, if the role allocation is randomly determined, because subjects, in each role, have the same preferences ex ante. We test and reject this hypothesis.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	85-89
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	121
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.07.007
State	Published - 2013

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
The research was supported in part by research funds from the Florida State University , the Strategic Research Development Fund of the University of Southampton and the British Academy under grant number SG110905 to Christos A. Ioannou.

Keywords

Linear altruism
QRE
Trust game

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10.1016/j.econlet.2013.07.007

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title = "A test of stability in a linear altruism model",

abstract = "Linear altruism predicts the estimated preferences to be independent of the subject's position in the game, if the role allocation is randomly determined, because subjects, in each role, have the same preferences ex ante. We test and reject this hypothesis.",

keywords = "Linear altruism, QRE, Trust game",

author = "Ioannou, {Christos A.} and Shi Qi and Aldo Rustichini",

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AU - Qi, Shi

AU - Rustichini, Aldo

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KW - QRE

KW - Trust game

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A test of stability in a linear altruism model

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

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