A stackelberg game approach to distributed spectrum management

Meisam Razaviyayn, Yao Morin, Zhi-Quan Luo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

27 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a cognitive radio system with one primary (licensed) user and multiple secondary (unlicensed) users. Considering the interference temperature constraints, the secondary users compete for the available spectrum so as to satisfy their need for communication. Borrowing the concept of price from market theory, we develop a decentralized Stackelberg game formulation for power allocation. In this scheme, primary user (leader) announces prices for the available tones such that a system utility is maximized. Using the announced prices, secondary users (followers) compete for the available bandwidth to maximize their own utilities. We show that this Stackelberg game is polynomial time solvable under certain channel conditions. The proposed method is decomposable across the tones and is more power efficient than the Iterative Water-Filling Algorithm.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2010 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, ICASSP 2010 - Proceedings
Pages3006-3009
Number of pages4
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 8 2010
Event2010 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, ICASSP 2010 - Dallas, TX, United States
Duration: Mar 14 2010Mar 19 2010

Other

Other2010 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, ICASSP 2010
CountryUnited States
CityDallas, TX
Period3/14/103/19/10

Keywords

  • Cognitive radio network
  • Distributed spectrum management
  • Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraint (MPEC)
  • Stackelberg game

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'A stackelberg game approach to distributed spectrum management'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this