A Recursive Formulation for Repeated Agency with History Dependence

Ana Fernandes, Christopher J Phelan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

73 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We present general recursive methods to handle environments where privately observed variables are linked over time. We show that incentive compatible contracts are implemented recursively with a threat keeping constraint in addition to the usual temporary incentive compatibility and promise keeping conditions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D30, D31, D80, D82.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)223-247
Number of pages25
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume91
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1 2000

Fingerprint

Economics
Incentive compatible
Incentive compatibility
History dependence
Threat
Recursive method

Keywords

  • Mechanism design; repeated agency

Cite this

A Recursive Formulation for Repeated Agency with History Dependence. / Fernandes, Ana; Phelan, Christopher J.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 91, No. 2, 01.04.2000, p. 223-247.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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