A multi-agent congestion and pricing model

Xi Zou, David M Levinson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

12 Scopus citations


A multi-agent model of travelers competing to utilize a roadway in time and space is presented in this paper to illustrate the effect of congestion and pricing on traveler behaviors and network equilibrium. To realize the spillover effect among travelers, N-player games are constructed in which the strategy set includes N+1 strategies. We solve the N-player game (for N ≤ 7) and find Nash equilibria if they exist. This model is compared to the bottleneck model. The results of numerical simulation show that the two models yield identical results in terms of lowest total costs and marginal costs when a social optimum exists.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)237-249
Number of pages13
Issue number3
StatePublished - 2006


  • Agent-based model
  • Congestion
  • Congestion pricing
  • Game theory
  • Queueing
  • Road pricing


Dive into the research topics of 'A multi-agent congestion and pricing model'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this